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Abstract: The paper argues that attracting more economists and adopting a more-precise definition of
dynamic complexity might help econophysics acquire more attention in the economics community
and bring new lymph to economic research.  It may be necessary to concentrate less on the applica-
tions than on the basics of economic complexity,  beginning with expansion and deepening of the
study of small systems with few interacting components, while until thus far complexity has been as -
sumed to be a prerogative of complicated systems only. It is possible that without a thorough analysis
at that level, the understanding of systems that are at the same time complex and complicated will
continue to elude economics and econophysics research altogether. To that purpose, the paper initiates
and frames a definition of dynamic complexity grounded on the concept of non-linear dynamical sys -
tem.
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1 Introduction
Stanislaw Ulam was quoted as saying that using the term “non-linear science” is like «calling the bulk
of zoology the study of non-elephants» (Campbell, 1985). It is indeed rare, and likely impossible, to
come across a natural dynamical system that be exactly linear. And yet science and its applications
could not possibly have achieved their great successes without making simplifying assumptions, in or-
der to make most problems tractable. Mathematical models are idealizations of nature, involving ab-
stract entities and, quite often, simplifications.
Linearity is one of those. Linear systems do not exist, just like perfect circles, perfect triangles or
straight lines. They are idealizations: mathematical models that use linear operators, i.e. mappings that
preserve addition and multiplication. Whenever the effects of the natural non-linearity of things can
be considered negligible for the contingent purpose, a mathematical model is built that represents the
system as if it were linear: a first-order approximation. An audio amplifier is intrinsically non-linear
and its components do not obey the superposition principle (Feynman et al., 1964). Still, within cer-
tain amplitude and frequency limits, the circuit will behave in a linear fashion and be useful for hi-fi. 
Linear models are also useful because, subject to the hypothesis of linearity, many natural systems re-
semble one another: their behavior can be described with the same equations even if the contexts are
very different, such as mechanics, electronics, chemistry, biology, economics, and so on. On the con-
trary,  non-linear systems each have their own mathematical formalization and often not even that:
equations are substituted by numerical simulations. It was indeed only when digital computers started
allowing to venture into non-linear territory, that “non-linear science”, a.k.a. “complexity science”,
was born. 
In the early 1960s, it was discovered that finite variations of future states may originate from infinites-
imal variations in the initial conditions of a deterministic system (Lorenz, 1963) and that consequently
making long-term predictions is impossible in principle. In the 1970s, it became apparent that deter-
ministic systems can exhibit behaviors that cannot be explained on the grounds of the laws governing
the components (Anderson, 1972), and that chaotic behavior is a possibility even for conservative sys-
tems such as those described by Hamiltonians (Li and Yorke, 1975; May, 1976; Feigenbaum, 1978;
Coullet and Tresser, 1978; Ford, 1982).
Some of these findings had already attracted economists (Benhabib and Nishimura, 1979; Benhabib
and Day, 1980; Day,  1983; Grandmont, 1983, 1985; Begg, 1984; Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986;
Van Der Ploeg, 1986) when “econophysics” was born, around 1990. The subsequent “physics inva-
sion” in economics research has brought new methods, techniques and tools and some useful practical
results but it has so far failed to achieve the key intended objectives, like reducing «some perplexing
results of economic theory [...] to a few elegant general principles with the help of some serious math -
ematics borrowed from the study of disordered materials» (Săvoiu and Simăn, 2013), or  answering
questions such as «how large-scale patterns of catastrophic nature might evolve from a series of inter-
actions on the smallest and increasingly larger scales, where the rules for the interactions are pre -
sumed identifiable and known» (ETH Zürich, 2019). 
Furthermore, the econophysics endeavour has been entirely conducted by physicists (with the aid by
some mathematicians and information theorists), and it has attracted very few economists. This com-
pounds with the limited scientific success to create a general atmosphere of disillusion and in fact,
more often, disregard by economists (Omerod, 2016).
At about the same time, that is since the 1990s, the natural sciences have worked to understand the
complexity challenge that stems from dropping linear assumptions when modelling dynamical sys -
tems. Contrary to a widespread belief, this process is far from concluded, and some of its results still
have not made it to the whole of physics itself. Economy and finance seem characterized by a large
degree of such “complexity”, so perhaps econophysics will acquire new lymph when it reasons more
deeply about the fundamentals of non-linearity, while at the same time attracting more economists to
its ranks.
2 Linearity
A dynamical system is “a particle or ensemble of particles whose state varies over time and thus
obeys differential equations involving time derivatives” (Nature.com, 2019). A linear such system is a
set of non-interacting parts / particles: the sole interactions are those of the whole system with its en-
vironment. 
Furthermore, the linear system's response caused by two or more stimuli is presumed to be the sum of
the responses which would be caused by every individual stimulus. In the most general definition,
such superposition principle (Feynman et al., 1964) also subsumes homogeneity, meaning that if the
system's input is multiplied / divided by some quantity the output will increase / decrease by the same
measure. Qualitatively, one can say that in a homogeneous system a modification to the components
is proportionally reflected in a modification of the whole: 
F (a x + b y) = a f (x) + b f (y)
A linear system / problem can be broken into a sum of mutually independent sub-problems. When, to
the contrary, the various components / aspects of a problem interact with each other so as to render
impossible their separation for solving the problem step by step or in blocks, then the situation is non-
linear or “complex”.
The systems and the problems that are encountered in nature are non-linear, and indeed the best defi -
nition of the term system is possibly that of  “a set of parts that, when acting as a whole, produces ef -
fects that the individual parts cannot” (Minati and Pessa, 2006). However, to simplify the studies or
for application purposes, one often resorts to linearity as a first-order approximation: if the effects of
non-linearity can be considered negligible, a mathematical model can be built that represents the sys -
tem as if it were linear. This approach is fecund in many situations. As an example: an audio amplifier
is intrinsically non-linear: resistance, capacitance and inductance are not concentrated in discrete com-
ponents and, for that matter, resistors, capacitors, inductors or transistors do not obey the superposi-
tion principle. Still, within certain amplitude and frequency limits, it will behave in a linear fashion
and be useful for hi-fi; hence, its description throughout audio literature will always be that of a linear
system, even if in principle it is not. 
Linear models are also useful because subject to the hypothesis of linearity many natural systems re-
semble one another: their behavior can be described with the same equations even if the contexts are
very different, such as mechanics, electronics, chemistry, biology, economics, and so on. A linear os-
cillator is a model described by the same mathematical equation, whether it be a metal spring, an elec-
tric circuit or a stand-alone El Niño. (Complex systems, on the contrary, each have their own mathe -
matical formalization and, in many cases, not even that: equations are substituted by computer simula-
tions.)
Gigantic scientific and technological advances have been made using simplifying linearity assump-
tions, before computers started allowing to venture into non-linear territory. This is how “complexity
science” was born. 
3 Non-linearity
There had been, in fact, several explorations of non-linear territory made by scholars since the 19 th
century. H. Poincaré was the first to describe how an apparently simple system subject to determinis-
tic laws, such as that composed of three orbiting celestial bodies (e.g., Sun, Earth and Moon), can ex-
hibit a complex (chaotic) behavior (Poincaré, 1890). Other scholars, including A. Lyapunov, A. Bog-
danov, V. Volterra, N. Wiener and W. Weaver, made advances and contributed creating complex sys-
tem thinking in the first half of the 20th century (Magrassi, 2009).  
However, the field has acquired new lymph only with the advent of electronic computers, as they al-
low to simulate whenever mathematics does not do the job because equations are unknown or in -
tractable. The first application of a digital computer to non-linear exploration gave raise to the Fermi-
Pasta-Ulam problem / paradox in the early 1950's (Fermi et al., 1955; Dauxois and Ruffo, 2008), an
experiment that can be said to have inaugurated non-linear physics, and that «did much to prepare the
fertile soil in which the Kolmogorov – Arnold – Moser theorem and non-linear dynamics / chaos
eventually grew» (Ford, 1992).
3.1 Non-linearity and non-determinism
Fundamental, then, was the work of mathematician and climatologist Edward Lorenz, who made ap-
parent and fully appreciated the problem that Poincaré had touched upon in his three-body system:
when observing the evolution of a complex system (i.e., its trajectory in state space), finite variations
may originate from infinitesimal variations in the initial conditions (Lorenz, 1963). In other words, it
becomes effectively impossible to distinguish between two beginnings, even if they are infinitely sim-
ilar, because the future evolution of the system can differ substantially in the two cases. If we were to
model the evolution of continental weather, it may make a difference, to the effect of a probability of
a tornado in Texas, whether or not «a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil». Making long-term forecasts
is, in principle, impossible.
3.2 Non-linearity and deterministic chaos 
A striking exemplification of the above is to be found in another small system such as the one com-
posed of a population of predator animals, a population of preys and the food available to the latter. A
linear model turns out simplistic and inadequate for the situation: the population of preys is a function
of the predators’ population but, in turn, the latter will expand and contract based on the availability of
preys and that of vegetable food, which influences the preys population. The “preys – predators –
food” system is intrinsically non-linear: none of its components, or couples thereof, may be studied in
isolation from the others. And indeed, the Lotka-Volterra equations are a classical example of simple
non-linear model of an ecological situation, taking feedback into account.
Purposely simplified, the Lotka-Volterra model leads to the formulation of the so-called logistic map
(May, 1976):
xn+1 = r xn (1 - xn)
with x ɞ (0,1) a number representing the ratio between the current population and the maximum possi-
ble in the nth year. Iterating the logistic map it becomes plastically evident how the dynamical value
xn+1 be always dependent on the initial condition x0. As an example:
x3 = r3 (1 – x0) x0 (1 - r x0 + r x02) (1 – r2 x0 + r2 x02 + r3 x02– 2 r3 x03 + r3 x04)
By varying the parameter r which represents the environmental conditions, a number of weird things
happen (Figure 1), particularly for r equal or greater than 3.57, when periodic oscillations start being
replaced by pure chaos.
In addition to sensitivity to the initial conditions, a second property of complex systems is indeed de-
terministic chaos: the underlying laws (physical, biological, etc.) may be orderly and even determinis-
tic, yet chaotic behavior is possible.
Figure 1: The logistic map
Iterating the logistic map is equivalent to applying geometric actions of stretching, bending and com-
pression to the corresponding mathematical function. That is somewhat like kneading water and flour
to make pizza: by repeated stretching and bending, two particles of flour dough that were very close at
the beginning may end up being far apart; or a lump of dough that was initially concentrated may end
up being evenly distributed. The Baker's Transformation (Ornstein, 1989), a formal expression of the
pizza metaphor, is an abstract dynamical system that can be used as a paradigm for explaining the
possibility of deterministic chaos. And since it can also serve as a mathematical model for coin toss-
ing (ibid), it opens a way to delve into the profound nature of chaos and its possible relationship with
randomness.
3.3 Non-linearity and emerging behavior
In addition to sensitivity to initial conditions and deterministic chaos, a third essential property of
complexity is  emerging behavior: even when the laws governing its components are well-known, a
complex system may show a behavior that cannot be explained on those grounds. 
A certain popular literature on complexity (Magrassi, 2013) tends to furnish us with examples from
the living world or other high-level natural systems (flocks of birds and colonies of ants behave in
ways inexplicable based on what we know of the capabilities of the individuals), however emergence
has been known to physicists since Phil Anderson showed it in the case of groups of electrons in a
semiconductor (Anderson, 1972). As he clarified many times afterward, emergent complex phenome-
na are not violations of the microscopic laws: they simply «do not appear as logically consequent» on
them (Anderson, 1995). 
Anderson's discovery of emergence in elementary particles closed the door to the hope of fully deci-
phering Nature by merely finding the fundamental laws of physics: it was the end of reductionism.
Due to component interactions, at each geometrical level of Nature (quark, neutron, nucleus, atom,
molecule, virus, life cell, etc.) new sets of laws may appear that, while compatible with the lower-lev -
el ones, introduce new knowledge.
4 The origin of complexity and its extent
What makes a system complex is not the number of components, but the interactions between them –
the ultimate cause of non-linearity (Bridgman, 1927).  This explains why complexity can emerge in
“toy” problems / systems like Poincaré’s three-body, May's prey-predator-food scenario or, to name
one more recent finding, the coupling of a human heartbeat with breathing (Wessel et al., 2009). 
A system made of many non-interacting parts is merely complicated (from Latin complico, to fold): it
takes a long time to unfold it, to solve it, but it can be done step by step. On the other hand, a complex
system, from complector (to encircle, to embrace firmly, to comprise, to unite under a single thought
and a single denomination) (Magrassi, 2009b), is hard to tackle because, in addition to the laws gov-
erning the components, we need to study the system’s overall behavior: the analytic approach must be
complemented with the holistic one.  Clearly,  an increasing number of interacting components will
give raise to increasing complexity, possibly exponentially: complex  and complicated makes things
worse.
This is the dynamical / systemic view of complexity. Another possible view is the computational /
structural one: ultimately related to Gödel incompleteness theorems, the structural view is predomi -
nantly adopted in information theory, where it has to do with the computability of algorithms. The
two views are ultimately connected via the concept of entropy (Ford, 1992; Falcioni et al., 2003), and,
it should be noted, optimization problems can be described in terms of dynamical systems that be -
come transiently chaotic as optimization hardness increases (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2011). 
The discovery of emerging behavior in elementary particles (Anderson, 1972), along with the chaotic
behavior seen in small deterministic systems, shows how intimately the natural world is permeated
with complexity. For decades, however, this was never communicated effectively outside the physical
community, despite Anderson gaining a Nobel Price in 1977 for related works. The news that usually
make it out of the world of physics are those concerning the two extreme fields of elementary parti-
cles and astrophysics, because of the grandiose scale, the cost and the mediatic impact of projects
such as super-accelerators or spacecraft-mounted probes and telescopes. News from other sub-do-
mains of physical research rarely make it to life scientists or social scientists.
The mesoscale is that level of matter where (1) age is not much relevant, as it is instead for galaxies,
and where (2) it is not useful to regard structures as groups of elementary particles (like in an atom),
because these are far too many and statistical means or higher-level laws become necessary. This sub-
domain of physics has always been a hotbed for powerful applications, like X-rays or transistors or
lasers, but it was never regarded as a source of better explanations of Nature like it happened with
subatomic physics or astrophysics. It is therefore not surprising that the consciousness of emergence
as a physical phenomenon -as opposed to to an exclusive feature of living organisms- is taking a long
time to make it to the mainstream of complex studies outside of physics or even outside of just con -
densed matter physics. Even the very notion that complexity reveal itself in minimal systems, often
goes neglected.
5 Complexity and economics
The 21st century economic world is obviously characterized by an increasing number of connections.
Financial  markets  are  strongly interconnected.  Economies  are  interconnected due to  globalization
(McKinsey, 2014). Enterprises are increasingly interconnected in supply and demand chains (Sodhi
and Tang, 2010), ecosystems, and “clouds”. Consumers are interconnected, and influence each others’
behaviors, via communications forms of all sorts, such as social networks. This means that markets,
prices,  supplies,  demands,  consumers  are all  interacting and  potentially giving raise to non-linear
“systemic”, emergent performance. All this could challenge the survival of economic agents or sys-
tems, making systemic risk highest (Malevergne and Sornette; 2006; Lo 2009;  Battiston et al., 2011;
Haldane and May, 2011; Haubrich and Lo, 2013; Haldane, 2014). 
The suspect that non-linearity might be a factor at play in economics mounted among economists in
the 1980s (Benhabib and Nishimura, 1979; Benhabib and Day, 1980; Day, 1983; Grandmont, 1983,
1985; Begg, 1984; Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986; Van Der Ploeg, 1986), but it was eventually ruled
out as a perturbation incapable of modifying the dominant economics paradigm. In the words of Jess
Benhabib (Benhabib, 2008):
The aperiodic but bounded trajectories that characterize chaos and exhibit sensitive dependence
on initial conditions cannot continue to diverge forever. They converge not to a point or a periodic
cycle, but to a bounded chaotic or "strange" attractor. The dynamical system which induces the lo-
cal separation and instability of the trajectories must eventually bend them back. The combination
of local stretching and global folding generates the complex nature of the dynamics. 
Such dynamic behavior is in fact a familiar theme in economics that highlights the self-correcting
nature of the economic system. Shortages create incentives for increased supply; dire necessities
give rise to inventions as the invisible hand guides the allocation of resources. An equally familiar
theme is that of instability: the multiplier interacts with the accelerator, leading to explosive or im-
plosive investment expenditures; self-fulfilling expectations give rise to bubbles and crashes. 
In combination, these two themes suggest a nonlinear system, somewhat unstable at the core, but
effectively contained further out. The contribution of the new literature on chaotic dynamics start-
ing in the early 80s has been to demonstrate the compatibility of endogenous irregular fluctuations
with equilibrium dynamics in economics.
[...] At this point, while we know that standard dynamic equilibrium models with parameters cali-
brated to values often used in the literature may well generate chaotic dynamics, more definitive
empirical evidence for chaos in economics has not yet been produced.
Said economics paradigm is deeply rooted in linearity. A market is assumed to always be in the sur-
roundings of an equilibrium (a point, line, surface, volume or hypervolume in state space), as well as
to be efficient, unpredictable and capable of smoothing out all imperfections in the large numbers.
Even before the “complexity awakening” of the 1980s, economists had long been aware of the limita -
tions of such tranquil vision (Scarf, 1960; Sonnenschein, 1972; Stiglitz, 1975), but economic theory
remains essentially a world of linear interactions and Gaussian-distributed risks:  the same “disorga-
nized complexity” (Weaver, 1948) of Brownian motion and equilibrium thermodynamics.
6 Econophysics
The prodromes of econophysics can be traced to L. Bachelier, V. Pareto, B. Manldelbrot or J. Tinber-
gen,  and explicit  econophysical  suggestions were presented in  the  late  1970s (Rand,  1978;  Ford,
1982). But it acquired momentum after the “Evolutionary Paths of the Global Economy Workshop”,
held September, 1987, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, where for the first time eminent economists, physi -
cists and other natural scientists got together to discuss, among other things, the dominant paradigm in
economics research and the possible contributions from physics and the natural sciences in general
(Anderson et al. 1988). 
These were the first attempts by physicists to step in and help, with the tools of their trade, proposing
answers to questions such as «under what conditions chaotic behavior may emerge from a model in-
corporating specific economic structures» (Day, 1983), or  «how large-scale patterns of catastrophic
nature might evolve from a series of interactions on the smallest and increasingly larger scales, where
the rules for the interactions are presumed identifiable and known» (ETH Zürich, 2019); and, perhaps,
reducing «some perplexing results of economic theory [...] to a few elegant general principles with the
help of some serious mathematics borrowed from the study of disordered materials» (Săvoiu and
Simăn, 2013)
The “physics invasion” was encouraged by the growing availability of fine-grained empirical data in
databases concerning markets and economic observations, on which scholars started applying mathe -
matical methods typical of hard science and adopted an empirical approach consisting in looking at
historical data without assuming much of any economic theory,  while  searching similarities with
known phenomena in physics. It soon became possible for physicists to publish on economic model-
ing in physical  journals,  as was the case, e.g.,  with the pioneering works of Eugene Stanley and
Rosario Mantegna in the early 1990s (Mantegna, 1991) (Mantegna and Stanley, 1995).
Non-linearity, systems operating far from equilibrium, and “organized disorder” (deterministic chaos,
emerging behavior) were some of concepts brought in by the earliest econophysicists: just about the
opposite  of  what  happens  in  the  rational-expectations-  and  efficient-market-hypothesis  paradigm,
where markets have no internal dynamics and chaos may only be stochastic. R. Mantegna, for exam-
ple, was first to show “experimentally” that price indices in a Stock Exchange have statistical proper-
ties that are not Gaussian but rather compatible with a Lévy random walk with a non-local memory
coupling price and time, and attributed the result to the openness and far-from-equilibrium character-
istics of the system he had investigated, i.e. a financial market (Mantegna, 1991). Closed systems at
equilibrium had been the economic modeling standard until then. In fact, Mantegna rightfully noted
that physics, too, was abusing such reassuring assumptions: «an improper  generalization of a proper-
ty of the best known stochastic  process, [...] Gaussian Brownian motion […]», had caused «a lack of
interest for Lévy stable distributions in physics», despite the fact that «widespread  investigations of
open non-equilibrium systems» had shown that «statistical distributions with power-law tails are often
present in natural and social phenomena» (ibid).
The dissipative systems that Mantegna had in mind were similar to those that had been studied in the
thermodynamic approach to complexity, inaugurated by I. Prigogine (Prigogine, 1977) and that subse-
quently generated a strand of econophysical study sometimes called thermoeconomics. Another early
econophysical approach consisted in drawing analogies from models developed in condensed matter
physics. For example, a spin glass is a system characterized by non-ergodicity, an extreme fragility
with respect to small changes in parameters and the de facto absence of equilibrium (Anderson 1972b;
Parisi,  1983):  this  was one of  the  first  models  proposed in  econophysics  (Anderson et  al.,  1988;
Bouchaud, 2009). 
The widest class of models are agent-based models, which econophysics shares with, and in fact im-
ported from, pure economics research. Here, the domain under investigation is explored via computer-
based simulation. Numerical investigation of a model does not rigorously prove anything, yet pro-
vides a formidable tool, a «telescope of the mind multiplying human powers of analysis and insight
just as a telescope does our powers of vision» (Buchanan, 2008). Simulations of this sort often lead to
situations very different from the perpetual quasi-equilibrium of efficient markets. For example, cata -
strophic meltdowns can take place abruptly, something that in incumbent macroeconomic models, and
contrary to empirical evidence, may happen only with infinitely small probabilities. The earliest of
this kind of simulations by econophysicists are to be found in, e.g., (Lux and Marchesi, 1999; Macal
et al., 2004), and had been anticipated by purely economics research such as in (Kim and Markowitz,
1989) or (Arthur et al., 1997), a work which counted as co-author John Holland, the “father” of genet-
ic algorithms (Holland, 1975). 
Deep and up-to-date accounts of this thread of research as well as the whole of econophysics will be
found in (Aste and Di Matteo, 2010; Kutner et al., 2018), while a more synthetic overview of the ma -
jor achievements is in (Bouchaud, 2019). On the other hand, the struggle by econophysicists to get
recognition  within  the  economics  community  is  narrated  in  (Gallegati  et  al,  2006;  Ball,  2006;
Omerod, 2016; Ausloos et al., 2018). 
In a nutshell: (1) the cooperation between econophysicists and economists is still very low; (2) econo-
physics results have not shocked the economics community; (3) econophysicists resist to accepting an
overarching macroeconomic model of «mild fluctuations around a stable equilibrium» (Bouchaud,
2019); (4) nobody knows how to reconcile the supposed (by mainstream economists) Brownian mo-
tion and ergodicity of financial markets with the intermittent, fat-tailed nature of asset prices, although
the issue started being investigated long before econophysics  (Mitchell, 1915; Olivier, 1926; Mills,
1927; Larson, 1960; Houthakker, 1961); (5) econophysicists have a tendency to erroneously assimi-
late the efficient-markets hypothesis (EMH) with the presumed Gaussian character of stock market
variations (Ausloos et al., 2018). 
The latter issue is particularly tricky. The EMH has gained among econophysicists the fame of a dog-
ma -a word that actually recurs often in their literature. However the true meaning of the theory is
sometimes dismissed too soon in such papers. In Fama's canonical definition, a market is said to be
efficient  with respect  to  an information set if  the asset  price “fully reflects”  that  information set
(Fama, 1970). I.e.,
E ( pj,t+1 | Фt ) =  pj,t [ 1 + E ( rj,t+1 | Фt ) ]
where E is the expected-value operator; the random variable  p is the price of asset j at time t; r, also a
random variable, is the one-period percentage return; Фt is a symbol for whatever set of information is
assumed to be “fully reflected” in the price at t. As (Sewell, 2011) effectively put it, the definitional
“fully” is an exacting requirement, suggesting that no real-world market could ever be efficient. This
implies that the EMH may be exactly false although asymptotically true. This is not an uncommon sit -
uation in science. To use an analogy drawn from a field adjacent to the present discussion, a nonlinear
dynamical system has zero probability to sit exactly on a chaotic attractor in phase space, however all
its trajectories are asymptotic to some generic trajectory on the attractor with probability 1, and thus
the dynamics of the attractor still governs the observed long-term behavior of the system (Ornstein,
1989).
The reason the EMH is sometimes labeled a dogma is that it still cannot be tested. However no alter -
native theory so far has either been tested or even formally proved. When the criticism was raised that
an efficient-markets-based theory would always be clueless at anticipating shocks such as the sub-
prime crisis culminated in the 2008 financial meltdown, Eugene Fama replied that the 2008 financial
crash was the efficient-market anticipation of an upcoming economic recession, and that finance had
been the victim, not the cause, of the economy meltdown (Cassidy, 2010).
7 The effects of complexity
The merely approximate correctness of the EMH also leads to an epistemological issue which is relat-
ed to the role of complexity in economics. Many things in science are approximate, and no physical
laws are universally exhaustive.
The basic physical constants, such as Plank's, Boltzmann's and Avogadro's, or the speed of light and
the electron charge, that is numbers playing key roles in fundamental equations, have always been
known with approximation (they were given de jure exact values effective May 20, 2019, in order to
rationalize measurement in science, technology and everyday life), but this has not prevented science
and technology from making great progress, exactly like it happened with the linearity assumption.
Objects in the mesoscale do not seem to obey [only] the laws of quantum mechanics, and classical
physics “emerges” -most likely due to quantum decoherence- out of a quantistic underlying world.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is negligible and uninteresting when the energy of the objects being
observed is much larger than Plank's constant, i.e. about 10 -34 Joule*second. In many everyday situa-
tions, including some highly sophisticated technologies, we are not concerned about the effects of
Special or General Relativity, because the objects we deal with do not usually move at speeds close to
light’s or travel extremely long distances: the relativistic effects are negligible most of the time.
Our “laws of nature” are imperfect and only work within roughly predefined bounds. Thinking of the
economy, one may therefore ask: (1) Is the EMH's asymptotic [presumed] validity really a problem?
Does it always have a measurable, non-negligible impact on applications, such as the S&P500 or Mi-
lan's Stock Exchange (the object of Mantegna's famous analysis)? Are irregularities unforeseen by the
EMH really due to the EHM's essential invalidity, or do they originate from emerging higher-level
laws which we still ignore? And (2) does the non-linearity of economics always have a measurable,
non-negligible impact? 
Neither the economics or the econophysics scientific literature seem to contain answers to those ques-
tions.
8 Conclusions
The natural sciences are still struggling with the complexity challenge that stems from relaxing linear
assumptions when modeling dynamical systems, like Fermi, Pasta, Ulam and Tsingou-Menzel first
did in 1953 (Dauxois and Ruffo, 2008). Contrary to a widespread belief, the process is far from con-
cluded. Physics itself is still largely based on linear models at its core, and some of the key results of
non-linear studies, obtained in chemistry and condensed-matter physics, still have not made it to the
whole of the natural sciences themselves, much less to economics. 
Considering the quasi-obvious  “complexity”  (in  the  sense  precisely defined  in  this  paper)  of  the
macroeconomy and of global financial markets, as well as the scarcity of economists who have partic-
ipated to the econophysics endeavor so far, perhaps economics research would benefit if physicists
and economists finally joined to make econophysics a hotbed for non-linear studies in economics.
This would possibly entail a more in-depth exploration of complexity than it has been conducted thus
far in econophysics. It may be necessary to concentrate less on the applications than on the basics of
economic complexity, beginning with expansion and deepening of the study of small systems with
few interacting components, while until thus far complexity has been assumed to be a prerogative of
complicated systems only. It is possible that without a thorough analysis at that level, the understand-
ing of systems that are at the same time complex and complicated will continue to elude us.
It might as well be useful to deepen from an economics viewpoint the study of the entanglement be-
tween stochastic and chaotic processes, like it happens in statistical physics, chemistry and informa-
tion theory:  which means  that,  perhaps,  some  scholars  from all  those disciplines  should join the
econophysics community, whatever its future name is going to be.
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